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INTRODUCTION

"Jackpot justice" is the current state of affairs with regard to punitive
damages, "a system in which anyone can seek punitive damages for almost
anything and wind up a multi-millionaire."'
Typical of these colossal
punitive damages awards are recent verdicts such as a $28 billion award to a
dying smoker against a tobacco company, a $271 million award to a burn
victim against a gas company, and a $290 million award to a victim in a fatal
rollover case against Ford Motor Company. 2 Justice Kennedy has stated that
these "'[r]unaway' punitive damages are not good for the legal system."3
Some scholars believe that "[r]eform is needed to address the chilling effect
that the threat of runaway punitive damages" poses.4
Unlike punitive damages, compensatory damages are relatively
straightforward because they are geared toward compensating for the
economic and non-economic losses faced by a victim.' Punitive damages,
on the other hand, are not6 reimbursement but rather address the goals of
punishment and deterrence.
Punitive damages, long recognized as constitutional, have changed in a
way that has altered the character and the amount of such damages.7 The
frequency with which punitive awards are granted and the amounts awarded
have grown substantially with time. 8 Starting in the 1990s, the Supreme
Court began the process of refining the parameters of punitive damages. 9
Four seminal Supreme Court cases decided during the 1990s refined the
body of punitive damages law.' ° This fine-tuning clarified the constitutional

1. Warren Richey, Court Weighs Limits on 'Jackpot' Jury Awards, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE

MONITOR, Dec. 10, 2002, at 2, available at 2002 WL 6429664.
2. Id.
3.

Mark A. Hofmann, Supreme Court Considers Punitive Award Limits, BUSINESS INSURANCE,

Dec. 16, 2002, at 4, 4, availableat 2002 WL 9518736.
4. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages "Run wild": Proposalfor Reform by
Courts and Legislatures,65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1010 (1999).

5. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1004. Examples of economic losses include "lost wages, medical
expenses, and substitute domestic services." Id. Examples of non-economic losses include "pain
and suffering." Id.
6. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and
Implicationsfor Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 110-11 (2002).

7. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1006-10.
8. Id.
9. M. Stuart Madden, Renegade Conduct and Punitive Damages in Tort, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1175,
1184-85 (2002).

10. Cooper Industr., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001) (establishing de
novo standard of review for punitive damages awards); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996) (limiting punitive damages awards to a state's legitimate interest and assuring adequate
notice for the amount of a punitive damage award); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509
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basis for challenging punitive damages," what can be punished, 12 the factors
used to determine if adequate notice was given to the defendant, 13 and the
standard of review for punitive damages awards.14
The most recent punitive damages award case reviewed by the Supreme
Court was a Utah case, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell.'5 The issue before the Court was whether or not one state can
consider the results of a nationwide pattern of unlawful out-of-state conduct
The Court had specifically left this
when determining punishment.' 6
17
State Farm is the country's largest
question open in a previous case.
8
automobile insurance company. 1 The jury verdict against State Farm was
$145 million in punitive damages, while the compensatory damages award
was only $2.6 million. 19 In State Farm, the Justices had "a chance to clarify
when misdeeds that are unrelated or occurred elsewhere can be taken into
' 20
This is important
account by a state court awarding punitive damages.
the role of
to
assume
tried
recently
have
courts
because "so many state

punishing or deterring nationwide conduct.'
This article analyzes what the State Farm case adds to the body of
punitive damages law with regard to the use of extraterritorial conduct. The
four seminal cases that refined the punitive damages canon prior to the State
Farm case are discussed in Part II. Extraterritorial conduct is reviewed in
Part III: its current use, a Ninth Circuit decision that confronted an issue
similar to the one in State Farm, and finally the State Farm case itself. Part
IV concludes by discussing the future ramifications for punitive damages

U.S. 443 (1993) (holding that the punitive damages award did not rise to a substantive due process
violation); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (upholding the punitive damages as
not violative of procedural due process).
1I. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 458 (providing the possibility for a substantive due process
claim); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 499 U.S. at 18 (providing the possibility for a procedural due process
claim).
12. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 (establishing that the scope of the conduct that can be punished must
be within the state's legitimate interest).
13. Id. at 574-75 (outlining criteria to determine if adequate notice was given as to the amount of
the award assessed for the conduct).
14. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 436 (establishing de novo standard of review for punitive
damages awards).
15. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
16. Seeid. at l515.
17. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 573 n.20 (stating "Given that the verdict was based in part on out-ofstate conduct that was lawful where it occurred, we need not consider whether one [sitate may
properly attempt to change a tortfeasor's unlawful conduct in another [s]tate.").
18. Patti Waldmeir, The Americas-Court Struggles to Set Rules on Damages Awards,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at 3, availableat 2002 WL 10486620.
19. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1515. The trial court reduced the jury award of compensatory
damages to one million dollars and the punitive damages amount to $25 million. Id. The Utah
Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million in punitive damages, but left the compensatory damages
at one million dollars. Id.
20. Waldmeir, supra note 18, at 3.
21. Id.
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awards.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:

A DECADE OF CHANGE

22
A. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip

Haslip's examination of excessiveness of punitive damages was
grounded in a procedural due process analysis.23 The case centered around
an agent for Pacific Mutual Life Insurance ("Pacific Mutual") and Union
Fidelity Life Insurance Company ("Union Fidelity") who purported to sell
health and life insurance to employees of Roosevelt City, Alabama.24
Pacific Mutual provided life insurance, while Union Fidelity provided health
insurance. 25 The arrangement allowed for payroll deductions for city
employees to pay their insurance premiums.26 That money was then given
to the agent, who was supposed to pay Union Fidelity based on the amount
collected. 27 Rather than remitting the28 money to Union Fidelity, the agent
misappropriated the funds for himself.
Subsequently, some of the city employees' health insurance was
cancelled without their knowledge.29 It was not until Ms. Haslip entered the
hospital that the cancellation of the coverage was discovered, forcing her to
pay the bill. 30 Haslip, along with other city employees, sued the agent for
fraud and sued Pacific Mutual under the theory of respondeat superior.3'
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the employees and awarded
punitive damages.32 On Pacific Mutual's appeal to the Supreme Court of
Alabama, the decision was affirmed.33 Pacific Mutual then petitioned the

22. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
23. Lisa Litwiller, Has the Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell for Jury Assessed Punitive
Damages? A CriticalRe-Examination of the American Jury, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 411, 454 (2002). A
due process challenge to a punitive damages award is based on a concern that "they potentially
deprive defendants of their property without due process of law, thereby violating the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Meghan Crowley, From Punishment to Annihilation: Engle
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.-No More Butts-Punitive Damages Have Gone too Far, 34 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2001). Procedural due process challenges focus on the procedures used to
arrive at the award to ensure fairness and prevent deprivation of the rights illuminated in the Due
Process Clause. Christine D'Ambrosia, Punitive Damages in Light of BMW of North America, Inc.
v. Gore: A Cry for State Sovereignty, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 577, 580 (1997). A substantive due process
challenge focuses instead on "the amount of constraint on jury discretion required by the Due
Process Clause and thus requires limiting grossly excessive punitive damages." Id.
24. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,4-5 (1991).

25. Id. at 4.
26. ld. at 5.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.

30.
31.
32.
33.
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Id.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
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United States Supreme Court, arguing that the punitive damages award was
excessive and violated the right to due process.34
35
The Court's decision was based on a procedural due process analysis.
In upholding the damages as not violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court asserted that it could not and would not
divine a "mathematical bright line" for application in all cases separating
what is unconstitutional from what is constitutionally acceptable.36 Rather,
the Court looked to the procedural processes used in Alabama.37
Three procedural elements were examined to analyze the process used
in assessing the damage award: "jury instructions, post-verdict review by the
trial court, and appellate review., 38 First, the jury instructions were deemed
to be proper because they focused on the goals of punishment and deterrence
not on compensating for the plaintiffs lOSS. 39 Because of this, the jury's
discretion in awarding punitive damages was not unfettered.4 ° Second, the
Court determined Alabama had two levels of judicial scrutiny for such
awards, which afforded careful consideration. 41 The trial courts in Alabama
"reflect in the record the reasons for interfering with a jury verdict, or
refusing to do so, on grounds of excessiveness of the damages. 42 Next, the
Alabama Supreme Court reviews the damages, assessing the amount to
assure it does "not exceed an amount that will accomplish society's goals of
punishment and deterrence. 43
In making this assessment, the Court used seven factors to determine
that the "punitive award is reasonably related to the goals of deterrence and
retribution. '" 44 Those factors were:
a) [W]hether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive
damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's
conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred; b) [T]he
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the duration
of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and
the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; c) [T]he
profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the
desirability of removing that profit and of having the defendant also

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
Corp.,
44.

Id.
Litwiller, supra note 23, at 453.
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
Madden, supra note 9, at 1185.
Id.
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19-20.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20-21 (noting that both post-verdict review and appellate review were in place).
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20 (quoting Hammond v. Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (1986)).
Id. at 21 (citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222 (1989); Wilson v. Dukona
547 So. 2d 70, 73 (1989)).
Id. (citing Hornsbv, 539 So. 2d at 223-24).

sustain a loss; d) [T]he 'financial position' of the defendant; e) [A]ll
the costs of litigation; f) [T]he imposition of criminal sanctions on
the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and g)
[T]he existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the

same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.45
Taking into account these standards, the court decided that the Alabama

judicial process allowed for "a rational relationship" between the twin
rationales of punishment and deterrence and whether the amount was met or
exceeded by the punitive damages award.46 The Court ultimately reasoned
that even though the award was greater than four times the compensatory
amount, there was not a procedural due process violation.47
The Court's analysis suggested that "fundamental fairness" and "general
reasonableness" were considered in evaluating the damage awards. 48 This
language used by the Court provided a window of opportunity for an
opposition to an excessive punitive damages
award based on substantive due
49

process, which is what happened next.

B. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.5 °
TXO made "explicit what was implicit in Haslip," finding "a substantive
due process right to be free from 'grossly excessive' punitive damages

awards., 5 The TXO Production Corporation ("TXO") brought an action for
declaratory judgment to settle a title issue involving oil and gas development
rights. 2 Alliance Resource Group ("Alliance") counterclaimed that the
action brought by TXO was actually a slander of title.53

The jury agreed with Alliance, announcing a verdict against TXO in the
amount of $19,000 in actual damages and $10 million in punitive damages.

4

45. Id. at 21-22.
46. Id. at 22.
47. Id. at 23-24. The Court stated, with respect to the ratio of the damages, "[wihile the
monetary comparisons are wide and, indeed, may be close to the line,... in this case it does not
cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety." Id.
48. Litwiller, supra note 23, at 453.
49. Id.
50. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
5I. Litwiller, supra note 23, at 454.
52. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,447 (1993).
53. Id. When geologists for TXO informed the company of the profitability of gas and oil
recovery in "Blevin's Tract," the company made a "phenomenal offer" to Alliance, who controlled
the rights for that tract. Id. The agreement stipulated that any consideration received by Alliance
from TXO would be returned if the "title ... failed." Id. at 447-48. Subsequently, TXO discovered
that part of the land's rights had been transferred to a different entity. Id. at 448. However, the
transferred rights dealt with coal mining, and it was "established that the parties all understood that
only the right to mine coal had been involved.., none of them claimed any interest in oil or gas
development rights." Id. Through a variety of maneuvers, including attempted bribery using a false
affidavit claiming an interest and lying about someone claiming such an interest, TXO tried to
convince Alliance that the title had failed. See id. at 448-49. TXO's attempt to create a true cloud
on the title with regard to the oil and mineral rights was a ploy to conduct renegotiations with
Alliance so that TXO could pay them less in royalties. Id. at 449.
54. Id. at 451.
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that TXO, "knowingly
and intentionally brought a frivolous.. . action" in order to reduce the
royalty payments due under the lease and thereby "increase its interest in the
a pattern of "similar
This was part of
oil and gas rights" for that land.
56
nefarious activities" by TXO throughout the country.
A three factor test to determine if a reasonable relationship existed
between the actual harm to Alliance and the punitive award amount was
applied by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.57 The "reasonable
relationship" test involved the consideration of: "(1) potential harm that
TXO's actions could have caused; (2) the maliciousness of TXO's actions;
to discourage TXO from undertaking such
and (3) the penalty necessary
58
endeavors in the future.
At the United States Supreme Court, TXO argued gross excessiveness
was seen in the punitive damages being 526 times larger than the actual
damages. 59 However, the Court deemed that proportionality was only one of
many factors used to determine whether the award was excessive.6 ° In
addition, the potential harm of the successful completion of the plan was
considered. 6' The Court concluded that there was no substantive due
process violation because the "shocking disparity between the punitive
award and the compensatory award.., dissipates when one considers the
potential loss ... in terms of reduced or eliminated royalties payments, had
petitioner succeeded in its illicit scheme. 62
Despite the Court's holding that the award was not "grossly excessive,"
TXO, combined with the Court's holding in Haslip, suggests that
challenging punitive awards can be done on both substantive and procedural
due process grounds.63
C. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore 64
1. Facts of the Case
After suggesting that substantive and procedural due process violations
can occur with an excessive punitive damages award, the Court in BMW

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 449.
Id. at 450-51.
Id. at 453.
Id. (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 889 (W. Va. 1992)).
Id. at 459.
Id.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 462.
Litwiller, supra note 23, at 453-55.

64. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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65
established a measure to determine if such constitutional violations exist.
Dr. Gore bought a BMW from an Alabama car dealer.66 After owning the
car for nine months without incident, he was informed by a detailing service
provider that the car had been previously partially repainted.67 Gore brought
suit against BMW alleging that the failure to disclose this information at the
time of purchase constituted fraud under Alabama law.68 BMW
acknowledged that it had a nationwide policy of repainting cars with predelivery damage if the cost to repair did not exceed 3% of the car's
suggested retail price.69 Under this policy, roughly 983 refinished cars were
sold throughout the country. 0
Upset by this nationwide policy, Gore argued that since the value of
each car was reduced by $4,000 as a result of the refinishing, BMW should
have to pay that amount for each of the approximately 1,000 refinished cars
it had sold in the United States as punishment, totaling four million dollars.'
The jury complied with Gore's request and awarded him four thousand
dollars in compensatory damages and four million dollars in punitive
damages. 72 The Alabama Supreme Court, upon review, remitted the
punitive damages award to two million dollars due to jury error, but did not
find the punitive damages award amount excessive.73

2. Disposition of the Case
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court for the first time struck
down a punitive damages award by a state court jury as excessive in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.7 4 The

65. Jonathan Gross & Jeffrey D. Hayes, What Punitive Damages Message is the U.S. Supreme
Court Sending?, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 447, 449 (2002).

66. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563 (1996).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 563-64
70. Id. at 564.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 565.
73. Id. at 567. The Alabama Supreme Court found jury error because "the jury improperly
computed the amount of punitive damages by multiplying Dr. Gore's compensatory damages by the
number of similar sales in other jurisdictions." Id. The damages were remitted to two million
dollars based on the assessment the court made comparing other similar cases. Id.
74. D'Ambrosia, supra note 23, at 589-90. What is important to note in BMW is that it was a
five-four decision. Id. at 592. Lower courts have consistently relied upon this decision in assessing
and reviewing punitive damages. See id. at 594-600. However, looking at the concurring and
dissenting opinions, there is still room for change when this issue is decided by the Supreme Court in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, docket number No. 01-1289, which was
heard by the Court on December 11, 2002. See id. Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, joined by
Justices O'Connor and Souter, stated that the punitive damages award in BMW was excessive under
procedural due process, but did not implicate substantive due process issues. Id. at 594. Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, "argued that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause does not provide any substantive guarantees against 'unreasonable' or 'unfair'
punitive damages awards." Id. at 598. Rather, punitive damages awards are within the province of
the jury to decide. Id. Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
stated that the decision in BMW treaded on what are traditionally state grounds and argued that the

484

[Vol. 31: 477, 2004]

Punitive Damagesfor Nationwide Conduct
PEPPERD1NE LAW REVIEW

majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, "analyzed whether the punitive
damages award was excessive in light of the goal punitive damages are
designed to achieve. 7 5 The Court's rationale began by explaining the
outside limitations of what can be considered in assessing punitive damages
Specifically, states have a legitimate interest in punishing
awards.76
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition within that state.77 States have
flexibility in determining the level of these damages, however they must be
"reasonably necessary to vindicate the state's legitimate interests in
punishment and deterrence. ' ' 71 States can effect their interests in a variety of
ways; there is no one uniform manner required in accomplishing these
goals. 79 To begin a federal excessiveness inquiry, first the state interests that
the punitive damages award was designed to accomplish must be
identified.80 One state's attempt to alter a policy on a nationwide level
impinges upon other states' right to implement their own laws and
regulations, thereby implicating federalism at its core.8'
In assessing the excessiveness of damages, the Court laid out a twoprong test.82 The first question was what can be punished and to what
extent? 83 That was answered by reference to the state's legitimate
interests. 84 Principles of state sovereignty and comity prevent a state from
imposing "economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of
changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other [s]tates. ' '85 A state can
protect its own customers.86 In line with this reasoning, a state cannot
punish nor deter conduct that is lawful in other jurisdictions.87 The rationale
for this limitation is "[tlo punish a person because he has done what the law
plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort. 88
The Court specifically left open the question of whether unlawful

Court is not suited to determine whether or not an award is constitutionally excessive. ld. at 599600. The resounding sentiment was that the guidelines proffered are vague and offer no real
guidance. Id. at 594-600.
75. Id. at 593.
76. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 569.
80. Id. at 568.
81. Id. at 572; Margaret Meriwether Cordray, The Limits of State Sovereignty and the Issue of
Multiple Punitive Damages Awards, 78 OR. L. REV. 275, 292-93 (1999).
82. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568-69.
83. See id. at 568.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 572.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 573.
88. Id. at 573 n. 19 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)).

extraterritorial conduct could properly be considered in
changing a
89
tortfeasor's behavior beyond the borders of the specific state.
Once the Court established that punitive damages must be appropriate to
effect a state's legitimate interest, the second prong of the analysis examined
whether adequate notice was given as to the severity of the punishment with
regard to the litigated conduct. 90 The Court articulated that "[e]lementary
notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that
a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a [s]tate may
impose." 9 To determine if the defendant had adequate notice of the severity
of the sanction resulting from the behavior in question, the Court outlined
three guideposts. 92
a. Reprehensibility
The first guidepost was reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.93
The Court stated that this measure is "[p]erhaps the most important indicium
of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award., 94 The enormity of the
offense should be reflected in the punitive damages award. 95 The notion that
"some wrongs are more blameworthy than others" was evidenced by the
Court's statements that "nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes
marked by violence or the threat of violence" and "trickery and deceit" are
more reprehensible than negligence.96 Additionally, some other factors
elucidated as adding to the seriousness of the behavior were "deliberate false
statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence of
improper motive, such as were present in Haslip and TXO. ' 9 7 Noting this,
the Court emphasized the notion that punitive damages may not be "grossly
out of proportion to the severity of the offense."98 Often the paramount
consideration in assessing a punitive damages award is the flagrancy of the
transgression.99
In applying the BMW facts to this guidepost, the Court noted that the
conduct in question demonstrated "no indifference to or reckless disregard
for the health and safety of others."' ° A significant sanction is warranted
when the acts are done with malfeasance or intent of targeting weaker

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 573 n.20.
Id. at 573-74.
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id. at 575.
Id.
Id. (citing Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371 (1852)).
Id. at 575-76.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 576 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,462 (1993)).
Id. at 575 n.23 (citing David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems

and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 387 (1994)).

100. Id. at 576.

486
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groups.'0 '
The Court reasoned that no such substantial penalty was
justifiable in BMW's case because, while BMW did cause economic injury,
it did not evidence the reprehensible affirmative acts required.'0 2
An important factor discussed by the Court with regard to what can be
03
considered under this guidepost was the use of other instances of conduct.1
Reasoning that engaging in continual conduct while knowing or suspecting
that it was unlawful would militate in favor of "strong medicine" to punish
such conduct, the Court turned its attention to recidivists.'0 4 The Court
noted that its "holdings that a recidivist may be punished more severely than
a first offender recognize[d] that repeated misconduct is more reprehensible
than an individual instance of malfeasance."' 5 This guidepost allowed for
consideration of previous conduct, whether in-state or out-of-state, in
determining the level of reprehensibility of that conduct
and whether there
10 6
was actual or constructive notice to the defendant.
b. Ratio
Of the guideposts, the ratio of punitive damages to actual damages is the
"most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive
damages award."'' 0 7 The reason for emphasis on the ratio was the
longstanding principle that punitive damages must have a "reasonable
relationship" to the actual damages. 0 8 The Court in TXO had altered this
traditional analysis of a reasonable relationship between the punitive damage
and the actual damage.' °9 TXO considered "the harm likely to result from
the defendant's conduct," not just the harm that actually resulted." 0
c. Sanctionsfor ComparableMisconduct
The most concrete of the guideposts is comparing the sanctions for
similar misconduct."' This consists of comparing the civil or criminal
penalties for the conduct for which
the punitive damages have been assessed
12
to the punitive damages award."

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 568-69.
104. Id. at 576-77.
105. Id. at 577.
106. Id.
107. ld. at 580.
108. Id. at 581 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993)).
109. See id. (discussing the rationale of TXO).
110. Id. (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 460 (1993)) (emphasis in original).
111. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 583 (focusing on judicial deference given to "legislative judgments
concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue").
112. Id.

487

The Court set the standard by invalidating an excessive punitive

damages award based upon a two-prong method of analysis, which was laid
out as the method to be used in making future determinations. 1 3 After
issuing the decision, it was1 4now up to the lower courts to begin the task of
applying the new standard.
D. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc." 5
In Cooper, the Supreme Court addressed constitutionality of punitive
damages awards in the context of the standard of review." 6 The parties
involved in this case were competing tool manufacturers."' Cooper decided
to market a product similar to Leatherman's Pocket Survival Tool, calling it
the ToolZall." 8 In the process of marketing the product, Cooper did not

prepare an original prototype in advance of selling the tool."

9

Rather,

Cooper used a mock up of the Leatherman product, removing its
distinguishing features, in all of their promotional material. 2 " Leatherman
discovered this and sued for unfair competition, inter alia, under the Lanham
Act. 12 ' The jury awarded Leatherman $50,000 in compensatory damages
and $4.5 million in punitive damages. 22 The appellate
court affirmed the
1
award using an abuse of discretion standard of review. 23
The proper standard of review for punitive damages was the question
before the Supreme Court in this case. 24 The Court determined de novo
review was to be used in assessing the constitutionality of punitive

113. Id. at 586.
114. Cont'l Trend Res., Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634 (W. Va. 1996), vacated by 517 U.S.
1216 (1996), was the first case to apply the newly established BMW measures. OXY USA, 101 F.3d
at 635. Just a few months after the BMW decision, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded a case
to the Tenth Circuit "for further consideration in light of BMW of North America v. Gore." OXY
USA Inc. v. Cont'l Trend Res., Inc., 517 U.S. 1216, 1216 (1996). On remand, the Tenth Circuit
attempted to apply the newly established guideposts. OXY USA, 101 F.3d at 634. The court
determined that OXY USA was liable for tortious "interference with contracts and prospective
business advantage." Id. at 635. The court in OXY USA relied heavily on the rationale of the BMW
opinion. Id. A state's legitimate interest was the beginning point for the opinion, which stated,
"because a punitive damages award must be based on the state's legitimate interest in 'punishing
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition,' a reviewing court must analyze the punitive award in
terms of conduct occurring within the state." Id. at 636 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
Continuing, the court emphasized the need for the economic penalties to relate to the state's
legitimate interest. Id. The court ultimately held that the two-prong test laid out in BMW required
remititur of the award against OXY USA from $30 million down to six million dollars. Id. at 64243.
115. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
116. Gross & Hayes, supra note 65, at 449.
117. Cooper Industr., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 427 (2001).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 427-28.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 428.
122. Id. at 429-30.

123. Id. at 431.
124. Id.
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damages. 25 In arriving at this decision, the Court considered its rationale
126
and holdings in analogous cases such as Ornelas v. United States.
Ornelas was a criminal case in which the Court determined that the proper
standard of review for probable cause and reasonable suspicion
determinations was de novo. 127 Explaining that "reasonable suspicion" and
"probable cause" are "fluid concepts that take their substantive content from
28
[a] particular context[]," the Court analogized this to gross excessiveness.1
Because the meaning of gross excessiveness is derived from the context, in
this instance application of the BMW factors, the independent review
afforded by a de novo standard provides control
of the law, clarification of
29
legal principles, and stabilization of the law. 1
The Court skirted a Seventh Amendment issue that would be
problematic for a de novo review standard. 3 ° Even though compensatory
damages and punitive damages are awarded at the same time, the Court
made a distinction between the two, stating that punitive damages are not a
"fact.' 131 Because punitive damages function as a quasi-criminal punishment
by promoting deterrence, the Court stated, "[a] jury's assessment of the
extent of a plaintiff's injury is essentially a factual determination, whereas
its imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral
condemnation.,"' 32 By establishing this distinction, the Court gave a
reviewing court the ability to analyze the excessiveness of a punitive
damages award de novo, giving that court more discretion.133
The impact of this on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell 34 is a lowered threshold of de novo review. 35 This allows the
Court to examine closely the Utah Supreme Court's decision without
requiring the judicial
deference implicated in the abuse of discretion
36
standard of review. 1

125. Id. at 436.
126. Id. (referring to Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 436 (citing Ornelas, 517 U.S. 696).
129. Id.
130. Litwiller, supra note 23, at 465. In the appellate review process, if "a fact found by a jury is
reviewed for anything other than abuse of discretion, it violates the Seventh Amendment prohibition
on re-examination of the facts found by a jury." Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Cooper, 532 U.S. at 432).
133. Litwiller, supra note 23, at 465-66.
134. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001).
135. See Cooper Industr., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001).
136. See id.
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E. HistoricalSummary
Over the past ten years, the body of law surrounding the
constitutionality of excessive punitive damages awards has been continually
refined.' 37 The first case to consider the constitutionality of excessiveness of
punitive damages awards focused on procedural due process.38 Haslip was
concerned with the procedures used to arrive at the award to ensure that the
process that deprives a defendant of life, liberty, or property is fair. 139 The
next case added the possibility of an excessiveness inquiry based on a
substantive due process violation. 40 The Court looked at the amount the
jury awarded in TXO and found the disparity between the actual and
expected harm done by the defendant and the amount of the punitive
damages award was not so "grossly excessive" as to violate due process. 141
A further refinement was laid out in BMW, which established a specific
methodology to determine punitive damages and review them for
excessiveness.1 42 This methodology focused on a state's legitimate interests
in
in punishment and deterrence, along with what notice had to be provided
43
order for a large punitive damages award to be found constitutional.
Finally, the Cooper decision allowed for closer scrutiny of punitive
damages awards by applying a de novo standard of appellate review.' 44 The
cumulative effect of the cases is that they allow for review of constitutional
challenges to excessive punitive damages awards with additional judicial
discretion. 145
However, despite the existing framework, not all courts apply the
standards set forth in BMW the same way. 146 Some courts have minimized
the state sovereignty limitations in awarding damages, allowing for plaintiffs
to argue that punishment for nationwide activities is permitted. 47 This gave
48
rise to the newest punitive damages case confronting the Supreme Court.

137. See Robbennolt, supra note 6 (reviewing historical cases and their impact on the punitive
damages awards analysis).
138. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991).
139. See id. at 20-22; D'Ambrosia, supra note 23, at 580.
140. Litwiller, supra note 23, at 454.
141. Id.
142. Id.; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
143. BMW, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75, 586 (laying out a state's legitimate interest in punishment and
deterrence and three guideposts to assess if adequate notice of the award was given).
144. Lisa Litwiller, Re-examining Gasperini: Damages Assessments and Standards of Review, 28
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381, 381-83, 410 (2002).
145. See Litwiller, supra note 23 (noting the effect of each case's holding in the arena of punitive
damages award decisions).
146. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 65 P.3d 1134, 1152 (Utah 2001)
(focusing analysis on the three guideposts after a brief mention that punishment and deterrence were
legitimate Utah interests, but not defining of what those interests consisted), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 1513
(2003).
147. See, e.g., Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139 (Ct. App. 2002) (starting the
excessiveness analysis with the guideposts and not mentioning a state's legitimate interest).
148. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 535 U.S. 1111 (granting certiorari).
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III.

EXTRATERRITORIAL CONDUCT

A. Current Status of ExtraterritorialConduct
BMW was the first Supreme Court case to put jurisdictional limitations
on punitive damages awards and use those limitations to assess the
constitutionality of excessive awards. 1 49 Adding to the canon of punitive
damages excessiveness analyses, BMW defined what a jury may properly
punish, and to what extent, before the punishment is deemed
unconstitutional. 5 0° This means states may punish conduct occurring within
their state if the punishment accomplishes a legitimate state interest. 15' This
excessiveness analysis reflects the founding principle of our country,
federalism. 5 2 Within our governmental structure, a basic precept is that
each state "possesses an inherent sovereign authority to govern its citizens
within its territorial borders, subject only to the supreme authority of the
federal government."'' 5 3 In order to maintain this independence, each state
must contain the reach of its laws within its own territorial boundaries. 54 As
BMW demonstrated, when necessary, the Supreme Court will step in and
prevent states that are "attempt[ing]
to overstep the bounds of their
155
sovereign authority" from doing so.
In limiting Alabama's extraterritorial reach in BMW, the Court focused
on economic regulation beyond one state's borders. 56 The majority opinion
emphasized that the Constitution embodies a "special concern both with the
maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed
limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual
[s]tates within their respective spheres."' 57
Accordingly, the Court outlined three basic constitutional principles
implicated by punishment of extraterritorial conduct: interstate commerce,
state sovereignty and comity, and due process.'58 The interstate commerce
rationale for limiting the extraterritorial reach of one state is due to the

149. See Litwiller, supra note 23, at 459-60.
150. Cordray, supra note 81, at 288.
151. Cynthia R. Mabry, Warning! The Manufacturer of This Product May Have Engaged in
Cover-ups, Lies, and Concealment: Making the Case for Limitless Punitive Awards in Products
Liabilit' Lawsuits, 73 IND. L.J. 187, 193 (1997).

152. Cordray, supra note 81, at 292-93.
153. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI).
154. Id. at 293 (referencing N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914) (recognizing
that states must operate only within their proper spheres); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669
(1892) ("Laws have no force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the [s]tate which enacts them,
and can have extra-territorial effect only by the comity of other Is]tates.")).
155. Id. at 294.
156. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1025.
157. Id. (citing BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996)).
158. Id. at 1025-26.
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burden on other states in having policy decisions made for them. 5 9 Once a
state enters into the national economy with its actions, federal interests are
activated to prevent usurpation of "federal power over interstate
commerce."'' 60 Congressional authority, not state authority, is necessary to
make "nationwide rules involving interstate commerce."' 6' Next, the Court
addressed issues of state sovereignty and comity. 162 Essentially, one state

cannot impose its own will or regulations on another state.

63

Punishing

extraterritorial conduct with punitive damages has been analogized to choice
of law cases, where, to apply its own law, a state must have sufficient

contacts to the claim in order to ensure faimess.

64

Also, taxation has been

compared to extraterritorial conduct, as a state is allowed to tax interstate
65

corporations only for the portion of business done within its borders.

Finally, the Court addressed due process concerns, stating that a state cannot
punish a defendant for activities or attempt to change the defendant's
behavior outside its territorial jurisdiction. 66 Therefore, punitive damages
that punish extraterritorial conduct of an economic nature, such as in BMW,

violate the constitutional precepts of interstate commerce,
state sovereignty,
67

and due process, making them unconstitutional. 1
In-state versus out-of-state conduct is important because "the reviewing
court must know what conduct to measure the award against in order to
determine whether an award is excessive...,68 With the constitutional

159. Id. at 1025 (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 571).
160. Id. (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 585).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 572).
164. Cordray, supra note 81. at 296-97 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797
(1985)). Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts was a case where 28,000 royalty owners from all over the
United States joined in a class action against Phillips for interest on past due payments on leases for
the use of the plaintiffs' lands to obtain natural gas. Id. at 297 (citing Phillips, 472 U.S. at 799). A
Kansas court certified the class action and applied Kansas law, despite the fact that a majority of the
leases and plaintiffs were not connected to Kansas. Id. (citing Phillips, 472 U.S. at 800-03). The
Supreme Court held that "Kansas' lack of 'interest' in claims unrelated to that [sltate, and the
substantive conflict with jurisdictions such as Texas, [rendered] application of Kansas law to every
claim in this case ... sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits." Id. at 297
(quoting Phillips, 472 U.S. at 822). The Court stated that, to apply one's own state law to a claim,
the state "must have a 'significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts' to the claims
asserted by each member of the plaintiff class, contacts 'creating state interests,' in order to ensure
that the choice of [the forum state's] law is not arbitrary or unfair." Id. (quoting Phillips, 472 U.S. at
821-22). Also applicable to punitive damages award cases, the Court stated, "[A state] 'may not
abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything done or to be done
within them."' Id. at 298 (quoting Phillips, 472 U.S. at 822).
165. Cordray, supra note 81, at 298-99. The Court stated in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div.
of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 784 (1992), that "the Constitution places limits on a [s]tate's power to tax
value earned outside of its borders" and exceeding those limits violates the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses. Cordray, supra note 81, at 298. States are limited by a business principle
delineated by the Supreme Court which provides for "a state to tax an interstate corporation on the
apportionable share of the business conducted in the taxing state." Id. at 299. This provides for the
state to act within its own borders, but that power stops at the state line. Id.
166. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1026 (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 572-73).
167. See id. at 1026-27.
168. Cordray, supra note 81, at 301. Scholars who have discussed punitive damages awards in
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parameters that surround interstate commerce, state sovereignty, and due
process, the foremost concern is whether the conduct punished by the lower
court is conduct that it had a constitutional right to punish. 169 The conduct

must relate to a state's legitimate interest in punishing and deterring that
conduct within its borders. 7 ° If not, then what part, if any, of that conduct
was constitutionally appropriate to punish? 7 ' Once the permitted conduct is
isolated, then the second prong, composed of the three guideposts, of the
BMW excessiveness analysis can be applied.' 72
The state may not consider lawful extraterritorial conduct in determining
punishment; however, the BMW Court left open the question of the use of
unlawful extraterritorial conduct. 173 As Gore produced no evidence that
BMW's conduct was unlawful in any state, and BMW produced evidence that
74

its actions were lawful in some states, the Court did not decide the issue.

Often a defendant's conduct might be lawful in some states and unlawful in
others.1 75 The theory behind not punishing conduct that is lawful in other
states is, in 76
part, based on state sovereignty, not imposing restrictions on
other states. 1
At the trial level, once the conduct that reflects the state's legitimate

interest in punishment and deterrence is identified, the jury can then consider
similar conduct by the defendant, even extraterritorial conduct. 177 Using the
guideposts to assess if a punitive damages award should be given, the
reprehensibility factor seems to allow for consideration of similar instances

light of BMW have tended to focus on the three guideposts set out by the Supreme Court, sometimes
as the whole analysis. rather than acknowledging both prongs with equal weight. See, e.g., George
Clemon Freeman, Jr., Constitutional Constraints on Punitive Damages and Other Monetar
Punishments, 57 BUS. LAW. 587, 605-06 (2002) (reviewing the case with one sentence saying lawful
out-of-state conduct could not be punished and focusing the remainder of the analysis on the
guideposts); Gross & Hayes, supra note 65, at 449 (2002) (focusing entire analysis on the three
guideposts); Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due Process, 49
SYRACUSE L. REV. 917. 951-52 (1999) (stating BMW reversed the award purportedly based on a
factor central to the procedural due process of notice, illustrated by the three guideposts); Michael L.
Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a
Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 63-64 (2002) (reviewing the BMW award
decision through the guideposts).
169. See BMW of N. Am., v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996) (discussing whether Alabama
had the constitutional power to punish BMW's conduct before examining the three guideposts).
170. Id. at 568.
171. See id. at 573-73.
172. Id. at 574-75.
173. Id. at 573 n.20; see Cordray, supra note 81, at 305-06.
174. BMW, 517 U.S. at 573 n.20.
175. Cordray, supra note 81, at 304.
176. Id. at 305. The other rationale is that punishing conduct that occurred in other states may be
a violation of an individual's due process rights. BMW, 517 U.S. 559, 573 n.1 9 (1996) (stating that
"to punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process
violation of the most basic sort").
177. BMW, 517 U.S. at 576-77.

of unlawful conduct, including extraterritorial conduct. 178 At first glance, it
might seem counterintuitive to prohibit out-of-state conduct in the analysis
under the first prong, but then use it in the second prong. 179 However, there
is a discernable difference between the two. 180 The first prong identifies
what conduct is subject to punishment, and that conduct is limited to the
boundaries of the state, provided it is lawful in other states.' 8' Once that
conduct is determined, the jury can use out-of-state conduct to determine the
defendant's blameworthiness
for, and the reprehensibility of, the act that
82
took place in their state.
For example, imagine that Ted is a telemarketer who targets elderly
people across the nation to sign up for an expensive magazine service. What
Ted does is allowed in six states but is prohibited in the rest. Ted is sued in
Alabama, where this type of solicitation, targeting vulnerable individuals, is
illegal. The jury returns a verdict of $100,000 in compensatory damages and
$25 million in punitive damages. When the jury assesses the punitive
damages award based on the conduct that occurred in Alabama, they can
assess how reprehensible Ted's conduct was by looking at the other
instances of conduct from across the nation. Ted knew that in most states
his actions were illegal, and he knew he was targeting a susceptible class of
people. However, the action being punished is the solicitation of the
Alabama residents. Therefore, only the solicitation of the elderly individuals
in Alabama can be punished. The jury can take into consideration the illegal
acts by Ted even if they occurred in another state. 83 This evidence can be
used to determine the blameworthiness of the in-state conduct, such as
whether Ted intended to break the law in Alabama. 1 4 As he broke the law
in forty-four other states, most likely he had knowledge that what he was
doing was wrong.
The real difficulty in allowing the use of similar extraterritorial acts is
that there is a fine distinction in their use that might not be readily apparent
to juries assessing penalties.' 85 This goes back to the majority opinion in
BMW, which compared this situation to the use of similar conduct in
assessing punishments for criminal recidivists. 86 The danger arises in that

178. Id.
179. See Cordray, supra note 81, at 312.
180. Id.
181. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568,573 n.20.
182. Id. at 576-77.
183. Cordray, supra note 81, at 312 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 576) (stating that the jury may
take into account "evidence that a defendant has repeatedly engaged in prohibited conduct while
knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful" even if it occurred in other states).
184. Id. at 313.
185. Id.
186. BMW, 517 U.S. at 577. Discussing the reprehensibility factor, the Court noted that its prior
holdings include "that a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first offender," which
"recognize[s] that repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance of
malfeasance." Id.
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the jury might choose to punish the defendant for all of the conduct, both the
conduct before them in the case and the similar conduct elsewhere.'87
With this background on the use of extraterritorial conduct, the door is
open for courts to determine the extent of the use of unlawful conduct in the
punitive damages analysis. 88 This was what the Ninth Circuit addressed in
White v. Ford Motor Co.' 89
B. Ninth CircuitCase: White v. Ford Motor Company'

90

1. Facts of the Case
The White case was the first to hold definitively that it is
unconstitutional to punish extraterritorial conduct, whether lawful or
unlawful.' 9' On October 9, 1994, White parked his Ford F-350 pickup truck
on his downward sloping driveway. 92 After putting the truck into gear, he
applied the parking break and went into his home. 193While playing outside
94
unattended, his three-year-old son Walter climbed into the pickup truck.
Looking for his piggy bank, he either pulled or kicked the gearshift into
neutral.' 95 The parking break did not hold and the truck began to roll down
the driveway. 196 Walter either jumped or fell out of the truck onto the
driveway, at which point the truck rolled over his chest, killing him.' 97
The Whites brought a product defect claim against Ford Motor
Company ("Ford") and the manufacturer of the parking brake. 98 The claim
asserted that, despite a known failure of the parking break, Ford continued
its sales. 199 The manufacturer settled, so the case proceeded only against
Ford. 200 Parking breaks are prone to wear and tear. 20 ' Traditionally, parking
breaks employed a system of "a cable pulled by the pedal, a ratchet wheel,
and a pawl., 20 2 The pawl is a finger-like device that hooks into a tooth on

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Cordray, supra note 81, at 313.
See White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998. 1013 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1019-20.
Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at1003.
Id. at 1002.
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the ratchet wheel.2 ° 3 After time, the cable stretches OUt. 2 ° 4 In an attempt to
avoid this problem, Ford installed a self-adjusting parking break.0 5 In 1990,
preproduction reports of problems surfaced.2 6 The problem was called a
"skip out," meaning sometimes the tip of the pawl would not hook into one
of the teeth on the ratchet wheel.20 7 The manufacturer could not replicate
this problem without severe abuse to the parking break. 0 8
In 1992, Ford's engineering team confirmed this problem, and a junior
engineer advised that this problem made the brake defective.20 9 In 1993, the
manufacturer developed a method of correcting the problem by inserting a
plastic wedge over the prawl. 2'0 For a variety of reasons, Ford did not recall
the trucks, but rather sent a service notice and wedges out to its dealers, so
they could fix the trucks that came in for service.2 11 Due to pressure from
the National Highway Transportation Office of Defect Investigation, Ford
recalled the trucks in August of 1994, but the notices did not go out until
November. 1 2
The controversy arose at the point of Ford's knowledge and action.2 13
Ford was aware of the "skip out" problem at the time the Whites purchased
their truck.214 The recall was decided prior to the accident that killed the
Whites' son.21 5 However, the notice did not go out until after the accident.216
Therefore, the accident happened after Ford's knowledge of the problem,
notification to dealers, and decision to recall, but before Ford issued the
recall notices.217
The jury found in favor of the Whites, awarding approximately $2.3
million in compensatory damages and approximately $150.9 million in
punitive damages. 2" The district court remitted the punitive damages to
approximately $69 million.2t 9
2. Disposition of the Case
The issue in front of the Ninth Circuit, in part, involved the use of
extraterritorial conduct in assessing the punitive damages award against
203. Id. at 1002-03.
204. Id. at 1003.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1003-04.
212. Id. at 1004.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1002. The actual compensatory damages were $2,305,435 and the actual punitive
damages were $150,884,400. Id.
219. Id. The actual remitted amount was $69,163,037.10. Id.
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Ford.220 Specifically, Ford argued that the jury instructions were flawed
because the judge refused to give instructions on the use of extraterritorial
conduct evidence.22'
The court began its analysis by quoting BMW: "the federal
excessiveness inquiry appropriately begins with an identification of the
states' interests that a punitive award is designed to serve. ' 222 The court
reasoned that since the United States Supreme Court began its inquiry with
federalism, this court would do so as well. 223 Federalism is comprised of a
state's ability to implement polices of its choice, limited only by the
Constitution and congressional mandates.224 To maintain this flexibility, no
state can impose its will on another state.225
The Ninth Circuit began its inquiry into the validity of the jury
instructions that created such a large punitive damages award by looking to
the guidance set forth in BMW. 226 Ford was not directly attacking the
specific number amount of punitive damages award, but rather the
information the jury used to arrive at that number. 227 In doing so, Ford
implicated an excessiveness inquiry with the desire to have only the in-state
to the jury.228 This was the first
conduct punished by limiting instructions
229
BMW.
in
prong of the test delineated

Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1012-13.
Id. at 1013 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)).
Id. at 1013 n.56.
Id.at 1013.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. The instructions given to the jury were the Nevada pattern instructions, as follows:
Members of the jury, you've now heard the evidence of the financial condition of the
defendant Ford Motor Company. Because you have answered yes to special verdict
question number fifteen, you may, in your discretion, award punitive or exemplary
damages against defendant Ford for sake of example and by way of punishment. Your
discretion should be exercised without passion or prejudice. In arriving at any award of
punitive damages, you are to consider the following: [o]ne, the reprehensibility of the
conduct of the defendant; two, the amount of punitive damages which will have a
deterrent effect on the defendant in light of defendant's financial condition. That's the
complete jury instruction on punitive damages, and you'll have this instruction with you
in the jury room.
Id. There was no mention of what conduct could be punished, just how to punish the conduct
according to Nevada law. Id. Ford wanted the following instructions on use of extraterritoriality
instead:
In determining the amount of punitive damages, if any, that is necessary for punishment
and deterrence, you may consider only [d]efendant's wrongful conduct that has had an
impact on the citizens of Nevada. You may not award any punitive damages for the
purpose of punishing [d]efendant relative to the sale of vehicles in other [s]tates, or for
the purpose of punishing or deterring [d]efendant's conduct outside the State of Nevada.
Id.
229. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568-69 (1996).
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

The court analyzed the first prong of the BMW test, a state's legitimate
interest in punishment and deterrence. 230

Even though extraterritorial

evidence can be used in determining reprehensibility, under the BMW
framework its use does not extend to punishment of conduct lawful in other
states.231 The court turned to the question of "whether a state can impose
punitive damages sufficient to punish unlawful (as232 opposed to lawful)
conduct in other states [as it] was left open by BMW.,
The main pieces of evidence in the case were the number of vehicles
Ford had sold nationally and the number of parking brake failures reported
nationally.233 The jury's consideration of this national evidence was not
limited by any instructions.
The plaintiffs closing argument only added
to the nationwide punishment notion.235 In closing, the plaintiff focused on
all of the people nationwide who owned the truck and did not receive a

warning.236

The number of trucks sold or affected in Nevada was not

mentioned in the close.237 The whole thrust of the closing argument "[iun

essence, [asked] the jury [] to measure damages by Ford's harm to the whole
country. 238
The court stated that even if the numerical size of the punitive damages
award was not "outside the bounds of due process," the reliance on the
defendant's extraterritorial conduct might itself make the award
unconstitutional. 239 The court pointed out that the Tenth Circuit had

addressed this issue in dicta, and their reading of the BMW opinion would
exclude unlawful extraterritorial conduct in determining what to punish.240

The Ninth Circuit Court gave two reasons for why they agreed with this
analysis. 24'

The first reason was that the conduct of consumer fraud

punished in BMW is likely wrongful in all states, it is just a matter of what

230. White, 312 F.3d at 1014 n.62. The court stated,
The Court held squarely that '[t]he award must be analyzed in the light of [conduct that
occurred within Alabama], with consideration given only to the interests of Alabama
consumers, rather than those of the entire Nation.' We are not free to ignore this holding,
nor to decline to follow the reasoning by which the Court reached this result.
Id. (citation omitted).
231. Id. at 1014.
232. Id.
233. Id.at 1015.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1015. The language used by the attorney included "there are 884,000 people in this
country who have these vehicles that got a letter that didn't tell them the truth as to why these
vehicles were being recalled" and "your verdict for punitive damages must be loud enough so that it
is on the front page of every newspaper tomorrow morning, so every person in this country knows, if
they have that vehicle, they can take it into the shop and get it fixed." Id. Additionally, the attorney
for the plaintiff "told the jury that Ford knew its actions would cause deaths of children 'across the
country.'" Id. This phrase was continually emphasized. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1016.
240. Id. at 1017 (citing Continental Trend Res., Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 636-37
(10th Cir. 1996).
241. Id.
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qualifies as consumer fraud in each state.242 The second was that the
punishment scheme in each state is different.24 3 The court reasoned that "the
variation in policies of punishment, even where the conduct is unlawful in
all states, amounts to an important distinction in policy." 244 The court used
the example of differences in punitive damages in different states.245
Nevada does not have a limit on the amount of punitive damages awards.246

Alaska has a ceiling on its punitive damages awards with half of each dollar
going to the Alaska treasury department.247 Therefore, when the jury
punished Ford's nationwide conduct to the tune of approximately $70
million, this could conceivably be ten times what
Alaska would have
2 48
awarded, with none of the money going to the state.
Ford, as a large, nationwide company similar to BMW, implicates
interstate commerce issues. 249 The Court in BMW stated, "[w]hile each
[s]tate has ample power to protect its own consumers, none may use the
punitive damages deterrent as a means of imposing its regulatory policies on
the entire [n]ation. '250 Continuing with its hypothetical, the court articulated
that Nevada is free to pursue a policy that promotes safety, while Alaska can
choose to have a policy that favors innovation.25 ' Therefore, the court
concluded:
If Nevada imposes an award based on vindicating a national interest
in safety, as the jury was encouraged to do in this case and as the
district court expressly permitted, then it may deter not only conduct
tortious in other states, but also innovation and economies of
production that other states
have purposely tailored their laws not to
252
discourage so strongly.
As federalism is a strong factor in cases such as this, no one state can
impose its policies of punishment on another. 3 Since the use of unlawful
extraterritorial conduct in establishing the scope of what can be punished has
direct implications on federalism, under the BMW rationale this use would
be considered unconstitutional. 4

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 1017.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

249. Id. at 1018.

"[Ilts status as an active participant in the national economy implicates the

federal interest in preventing individual [s]tates from imposing undue burdens on interstate
commerce." Id. (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996)).
250. Id. (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 585).
251. Id. at 1018.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See id.
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Finally, the court concluded that even if unlawful conduct could be
considered, the decision of the district court still violated the first prong of
the BMW test.25 5 Not all states impose a post sale duty to warn. 25 6 Those
that do have such a duty have different thresholds that trigger the duty. 7 As
BMW clearly enunciated, "[lt]o punish a person because he has done what the
law plainly
allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic
58
2

sort.,

Reversing the decision, the Ninth Circuit only considered the first prong
of the BMW test.2 5 9 It did not consider the excessive amount of the damages,
because the punitive damages award assessed was unconstitutional in and of
itself.2 60 The award punished conduct nationwide, not conduct related to
Nevada's legitimate interests. 261 Extraterritorial conduct is admissible in the
second prong of the analysis, degree of reprehensibility, only after the scope
of the conduct to be punished is circumscribed.262
3. Importance of the Decision
The decision of the Ninth Circuit is important as it closes the loop left
open by BMW.2 63 With this decision, the court firmly established that both
lawful and unlawful conduct cannot be used in determining what to
punish. 2 4 In its analysis, the court focused on the fact that each state
punishes unlawful conduct differently. 65 Allowing one state to punish
unlawful conduct occurring in many states or nationwide is to limit other

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 1019.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 573 n.19 (1996)).
Id. at 1020. The court stated,
Because we reverse on the ground that the punitive damages award unconstitutionally
allowed a Nevada jury to punish Ford for out-of-state conduct, we do not need to address
de novo whether these punitive damages were unconstitutionally excessive under the
BMW guideposts, as is normally required of us .... On remand, the jury must decide on
a punitive damages award within the territorial restraint established by BMW.
Extraterritorial conduct is admissible for its bearing on degree of reprehensibility, but the
jury must be limited to punitive damages reasonably required to vindicate Nevada's
legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence, if any, and prohibited from imposing
punitive damages to protect people or punish harm outside of Nevada.

Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. The court did note that the use of extraterritorial conduct in reprehensibility analysis may
be confusing. Id. at 1016-17 n.69. "In some cases the distinction between using the evidence as it
bears on reprehensibility but not as a measure of damages might be so gossamer as to be difficult for
a jury to apply, but in others the significance of the distinction will be quite clear." Id. The example
of when use of extraterritorial conduct is clear was that a jury cannot multiply the damages for one
plaintiff by how many other plaintiffs exist nationwide. Id.
263. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,573 n.20 (1996).
264. White, 312 F.3d at 1017-18.
265. Id. at 1017.

500

[Vol. 31: 477, 2004]

Punitive Damagesfor Nationwide Conduct
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

states ability to apply their own laws. 266 This decision protects the idea of
federalism on which our country was founded.267

In addition to assuring each state's ability to apply its own law and
policy, this decision addressed another important policy issue resulting from
the punishing of extraterritorial conduct.268 That was the issue of awarding

punitive damages for extraterritorial conduct, which is problematic because
it can lead to double recovery.2 69 By assessing multiple punitive damages
awards for one act, the potential of violating the due process clause by
effectuating a double recovery arises, which very well could violate the
guarantee of fundamental fairness inherent in the clause. 270 This double
recovery could limit the ability of other states' plaintiffs to recover. 27' The
wrongdoer's funds could be depleted by the continuous nationwide
punishments for a single instance of conduct.27 2 Or, in the alternative,
because there may be an overall damages cap on the amount that can be

constitutionally recovered, the first state in line to sue has the greatest
chance of recovering the largest amount of money. 273

"One state's

usurpation of another's ability to impose punitive damages to punish
conduct that occurred within that state's own jurisdiction constitutes a direct
A solution is to limit the
intrusion on that state's sovereignty. 2 74
punishment to the part of the conduct that occurred in the state, apportioning
punishment for the action in the state similar to the apportionment of profits

for collection of taxes, as described above.275
266. Jd. at 1017-18.
267. See Cordray, supra note 81, at 292-93.
268. Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court's Backwards Proportionality
Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and Excessive
Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1265 (2000).
269. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72
VA. L. REV. 139, 152-53 (1986). The risk of violating the inherent guarantee of fundamental
fairness protected by the Due Process Clause can be implicated when there are multiple punitive
damage awards arising out of one course of conduct. See id. Other problems include the depletion
of the defendant's funds, possibly preventing "future claimants [from] recover[ing] even basic outof-pocket expenses and damages for their pain and suffering." Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1030.
Additionally, there is concern over the "ripple effect" of allowing for recovery of multiple punitive
damages awards. Id.
[T]he devastating "ripple" effect can extend far beyond the defendant company to injured
persons who are thereafter unable to recover compensation for their injuries. There are
concomitant losses suffered by the company's employees, who may lose their jobs, as
well as by those other businesses that rely on the company or its employees for income.
Economic harm to the company also affects shareholders, such as pension funds and
ordinary citizens, and other investors who face the loss of their savings.
Id.
270. See Jeffries, supra note 269, at 153.
271. Cordray, supra note 81, at 305-06.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. id. at 307.
275. Id.
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These concerns led directly into the State Farm case, decided by the
United States Supreme Court, which raised the same issue of punishment of
nationwide conduct.27 6 State Farm, like Ford, is a large corporation that
conducts business nationally, therefore implicating the federalist issues
raised by BMW and White. 277 The Supreme Court had the opportunity to
close the loop on its punitive damages excessiveness analysis.278
C. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell

279

1. Third Party Insurance Cases
Before analyzing the State Farm case, it is helpful to have an
understanding of what a third party claim is with regard to insurance
litigation. 280 An insurance company issues a policy to an individual that
covers different types of liability; automobile insurance is one type of
liability insurance policy. 281 The insurance policy is between the insurance
company, the insurer, and the policyholder, the insured.282 When a situation
arises where the insurance policy is implicated, such as an automobile
accident, the insurer becomes involved.283 The insurer becomes liable to a
third party if the insured is found to be responsible, in this example if the
insured was the reason for the automobile accident. 2 4 As the insurer will be
responsible for the damages, the insurer often takes control and litigates on
behalf of the insured.285 Insurance policies contain provisions indicating that
the insurer will pursue the litigation on behalf of the insured with full
control, including control over whether or not to settle the case.286 The
insurer will pay an attorney to represent the insured.287
Despite the fact that it appears to be a benefit to have someone litigate
on the insured's behalf, liability insurance policies contain inherent tensions
between conflicting interests.288 Liability for the insurance company is not
2 90
unlimited. 289 Rather, policies have limits to what the insurer will pay OUt.

276. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1518-19 (2003).
277. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568-70 (1996); White v. Ford Motor Co., 312
F.3d 998, 1013-14 (2002); see Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1025-26.
278. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 122 S. Ct. 2326 (2001) (granting certiorari).
279. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
280. Gregory A. Bullman, A Right Without a Potent Remedy: Indiana's Bad Faith Insurance
Doctrine Leaves Injured Third Parties Without Full Redress, 77 IND. L.J. 787, 792-93 (2002).

281. Id. at 791.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. John H. Bauman, Emotional Distress Damages and the Tort of Insurance Bad Faith, 46
DRAKE L. REV. 717, 733 (1998).

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
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Tension is created when a lawsuit could expose the insured to liability in
excess of the policy and the insurance company will not settle within the
policy limits, choosing instead to take a chance at litigation.29 Specifically,
if the third party offers to settle within the policy limits, the insurer might
decide to litigate anyway.292 If the insurer loses the case, the largest amount
the insurer will have to pay is the policy limit.293 However, if the insurer
wins the case, the insurer saves money.294 If the case is litigated and a
judgment is entered against the insured, the insured will be responsible for
the excess amount over the policy limits. 295 The insured is at the mercy of
the insurer.296
As a result of this tension, courts began to recognize a tort remedy for
the insured. 297 This tort remedy is "viewed as a breach of the insurer's
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 2 98 Courts impose a duty on
insurers requiring that, if the insured is going to be subject to excess liability,
the insurer must put the insured's interests before their own. 299 Therefore, if
an excess verdict is returned against the insured, and the insurer failed to
settle the claim originally when the opportunity was present, the insured can
bring this tort action. 300 This tort, often called a bad faith claim, has
"significantly improve[d] the ability of insureds to pressure insurance
companies to pay under their policies., 30 ' The State Farm case was a bad
faith claim by Mr. Campbell against State Farm for exposing him to an
excess judgment despite the third party's willingness to settle within his
policy limits.30 2
2. Facts of the Case
Mr. Campbell was driving on a highway in Utah when he proceeded to
unsafely pass a car driven by Mr. Slusher.3 °3 This "unsafe pass" forced an
oncoming car, driven by Mr. Ospital, to veer onto the shoulder of the road
and subsequently collide with Slusher.3° Ospital was killed immediately

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 734.
Bullman, supra note 280, at 793.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bauman, supra note 284, at 734.
Bullman, supra note 280, at 793.
Bauman, supra note 284, at 718-19.
Bullman, supra note 280, at 793.
Id. at 793-94.
Bauman, supra note 284, at 719.
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1141-42 (Utah 2001).
Id. at 1141.
ld.

and Slusher was left disabled.3 °5 A consensus was reached early on that
Campbell was at fault. 30 6 State Farm was Campbell's automobile insurance
company.30 7 State Farm advised Campbell not to worry, that they would
take care of everything.30 8
Despite the other parties' willingness to settle within the $25,000 per
person policy limit of Campbell's insurance, State Farm refused to do so.309
Rather, State Farm took the case to trial, exposing Campbell to the
possibility of an excess judgment. 3'0 At trial, the jury returned a verdict
against Campbell, represented by State Farm, in the amount of $135,000.311
State Farm indicated intent to pay only the amount of the policy limit and
leave Campbell responsible for the remainder.31 2 Supposedly, an attorney
for State Farm told Campbell to put his house on the market to satisfy the
remainder of the judgment.3 13
Afraid and confused, Campbell met with Slusher and Ospital's estates to
make an arrangement whereby the judgment would not be collected from
Campbell in exchange for Campbell suing State Farm on a bad faith
claim. 314 The collecting parties would receive 90% of any recovery against
State Farm, and Campbell would receive the remaining 10%.315 Meanwhile,
after State Farm completed the appeals process on Campbell's case, they
paid the full amount of the excess judgment. 31 6 There was a dispute
regarding whether State Farm intended to pay from the beginning or if it was
a result of the bad faith claim by Campbell.3 17
At the trial court level, the case was bifurcated.318 In the first phase, the
jury determined State Farm acted in "bad faith.",3 '9 The second phase, which
is the focus of the remaining analysis, addressed a punitive damages
award.320 In an unpublished trial court decision, a verdict was awarded in
favor of Campbell in the amount of $2.6 million in compensatory damages
and $145 million in punitive damages.321 The trial court remitted the
damages.322 State Farm appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, arguing that

305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308.

Id.

309. Id.
310. Id. at 1142.
311.

Id.

312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1141.
315. Id.

316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. The trial court found State Farm "had acted unreasonably and in bad faith in its decision
to take the case to trial because there was a substantial likelihood of an excess judgment against Mr.
Campbell." Id. at 1142-43.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1143-55.
321. Id.at 1155.
322. Id. at 1141.
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the punitive damages award, although remitted, was grossly excessive under
federal law.323
3. Disposition of the Utah State Supreme Court
The Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court properly applied the
BMW factors and reinstated the full amount of the punitive damages award
against State Farm. 324 After addressing the state law issue of punitive
damages, the court began its analysis of excessiveness under the federal
law.325 The court established what it considered the standard for excessive
punitive damages by quoting BMW. 326 The quoted excerpt referenced a
state's legitimate interest in punishing and deterring unlawful conduct and
the need for flexibility in determining the appropriate damage award;
therefore, only when an award is "grossly excessive" can it be considered a
violation of due process under the Constitution.327 This was the only
mention of the state's legitimate interest aspect of the constitutional inquiry
into the excessiveness of punitive damages.328
At this point, the court focused on the three guideposts laid out in
BMW. 3 29 Utah has seven factors by which it determines excessive punitive
damages awards under state law. 330 The court indicated that its state analysis
under the second and third factors was analogous to the reprehensibility
factor under BMW, and under this analysis "the reprehensibility guidepost

323. Id.
324. Id. at 1146-52. State Farm challenged the punitive damages award under both Utah state law
and federal law. Id. at 1143. Some of the federal law discussion related to the application of Utah's
standard for punitive damages. Id. at 1145.
325. Id. at 1152.
326. Id.
327. Id. The exact quote in the opinion is as follows:
Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a [s]tate's legitimate interests in
punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition .... States necessarily have
considerable flexibility in determining the level of punitive damages that they will allow
in different classes of cases and in any particular case .... Only when an award can fairly
be categorized as "grossly excessive" in relation to these interests does it enter the zone
of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (citations omitted)).
328. See id. (revealing only a small mention of Utah's legitimate interest in assessing the punitive
damages award, while focusing mainly on the guidepost analysis of adequate notice).
329. Id. at 1152-55.
330. Id. at 1146-47. The court utilized seven factors that had been announced in Crookston v. Fire
Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991). This opinion was referred to as Crookston I.
Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1146. The precise factors are as follows:
i) the relative wealth of the defendant; ii) the nature of the alleged misconduct; iii) the
facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct; iv) the effect thereof on the lives of
the plaintiff and others; v) the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct; vi) the
relationship of the parties; and vii) the amount of actual damages awarded.
Id.
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''
[was] met."

The second Utah state factor, the nature of the alleged

misconduct, considered whether the conduct was malicious, reprehensible,
and wrong.332 After reviewing twenty-eight pages of "extensive findings
concerning State Farm's reprehensible conduct," the court isolated three
findings as examples of such behavior.333
The first example identified by the court was State Farm's PP&R
This scheme was purportedly used to "repeatedly and
"scheme. 334
deliberately deceive[] and cheat[] its customers. 335 According to the court,
for twenty years agents were routinely rewarded for paying less than market
value for claims. 336
The allegations continued that, because of this
"scheme," adjusters essentially lied, cheated, and fell just short of stealing,
all while targeting vulnerable victims who would most likely not sue.337
Destruction and concealment of documents related to the "scheme" was
a second example used by the court.
According to witnesses at trial, State
Farm repeatedly destroyed documents to avoid discovery. 3 9 State Farm's
failure to keep records relating to lawsuits filed against State Farm led the
court to conclude that this was an effort to conceal the number of bad faith
claims asserted against the company.34 °
Finally, the court pointed to State Farm's systematic method of
harassment, and its intimidation of "opposing claimants, witnesses, and
attorneys. 34 ' Witnesses came forward at trial describing the "mad dog
defense tactics" used by State Farm against them.342 Overall, the court

331. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1152.
332. Id. at 1147. The court pointed out that "repeated 'trickery and deceit' targeted at people who
are 'financially vulnerable' is especially reprehensible and worthy of greater sanctions." Id. (quoting
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 579 (1996)). Additionally, the court included
"deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence of improper
motive" as part of the measure. Id.
333. Id. at 1147-48. The court defined the pages of findings as reprehensible prior to its analysis.
Id. It is circular logic to use the same term to define the term you are seeking to define. Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,26 (1964) (circular reasoning occurs when the "premises of the argument feed
on the conclusion").
334. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1142. According to State Farm's brief to the United States Supreme
Court,
Plaintiffs [Campbell] took the term 'Performance, Planning and Review' from State
Farm's personnel evaluation program. This program was a 'management by objective'
program, a widely used method of personnel management.... Under this program,
various goals (ranging from spending less time on personal phone calls to responding
more quickly to customer complaints) were set for each State Farm employee and
recorded in the employee's file. For a period of time, State Farm's PP&R manual listed
among possible goals the reduction of average claims paid.
Petitioner's Brief at 7 n.8, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003) (No.
01-1289), available at 2003 WL 1968000. Prior to trial, State Farm ceased use of the PP&R. Id.
335. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1145.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1148.
341. Id.
342. Id.
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concluded that State Farm used unethical conduct in litigation.343 Looking at
all three examples, the court surmised that State Farm "engaged in a pattern
of 'trickery and
deceit,' 'false statements,' and other 'acts of affirmative
344
misconduct."
The court indicated the next Utah state factor that was part of the federal
reprehensibility guidepost analysis was the "facts and circumstances
surrounding State Farm's misconduct., 345 Analysis under this factor hinged
on intent and motive of the actor.346 The court quickly concluded that State
3 47
Farm knew of its illegal and illicit practices going back for years.
Additionally, the fact that State Farm would not concede that it mishandled
Campbell's initial case showed it had no remorse.348 Essentially, the court
concluded that this behavior supported the higher than normal damages
award.349
Next, the court analyzed the second guidepost elucidated by BMW, the
disparity between the harm and the punitive damages.3 50 The court began by
listing the four factors relied upon by the trial court to justify the high
punitive award.35 1 These factors, which the Utah Supreme Court adopted,
were:
(I) State Farm never reported previous punitive damage
awards ... includ[ing] a Texas judgment of $100 million; (2)
State Farm is an enormous company with massive wealth; (3)
State Farm's actions, because of their clandestine nature, will
be punished at most in one out of every 50,000 cases as a
matter of statistical probability; and (4) State Farm's policies
have affected vast numbers of other Utah customers.352
Citing a law review article, the court noted that "[m]any large
corporations are 'entities too powerful to be constrained' by remedies
provided by 'criminal and civil law.' ' ' 353 The only way to protect the public
is to use severe punishments.354 Noting that the punishment must fit the

343. ld.
344. Id. (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
345. Id. at 1149.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.at 1152.
351. Id.at 1153.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1153 (quoting Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of
Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1369, 1329-30 n.299
(1993)).
354. Id. at 1154.

crime, the court stated that it was State Farm's twenty year history of using
business methods targeting vulnerable groups that warranted such a
punishment.355 Additionally, the fact that State Farm had not changed its
ways after the Texas verdict and the statistical probability that State Farm
would harm again were reasonable justifications for the award.35 6 Despite
the constant focus on a nationwide pattern of activity, the court claimed that
the large punitive damages award was actually based on the facts of
Campbell's case, but was being upheld as not grossly excessive because of
these acts.357
The court quickly dismissed the third guidepost, comparable criminal or
civil sanctions. 358 The court listed possible sanctions that State Farm could
face. 359 Additionally, the court focused on the penalties that potentially
could be imposed, not the ones that must be imposed.3 60 The court found
that, based on all of these factors, the trial court correctly found a high
punitive damages award was appropriate.361
4. Reflections on the Utah Court's Analysis
The Utah Supreme Court focused its analysis of the large punitive
damages award on the principles outlined in BMW. 36 2 However, the court
began its analysis with the second prong, defendant's adequate notice of the
BMW test, analyzed by the guideposts.363 A majority of the controversy
surrounding this case, and the reason State Farm appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, was the Utah Supreme Court's inadequate attention to
the first prong. 364 What was Utah's legitimate state interest in assessing
punitive damages365of $145 million? Was it punishment for conduct across
the entire nation?
in
With a quick excerpt from BMW as to the state's right to be flexible 366
assessing a judgment, the court was off to the guidepost analysis.
However, the first prong of the BMW test needed further discussion.367 With
the quick reference to a state's legitimate interests, the Utah Supreme Court

355. ld.
356. Id.
357. id.
358. id. at 1154-55.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 1155.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 1152-53. The review of the damages award focused on phase two of the trial, which
had a different jury than phase one, and in which a punitive damages award was entered against
State Farm. Petitioner's Brief at 4-5, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513
(2003) (No. 01 -1289), available at 2002 WL 1968000.
363. Campbell, 65 P.3d. at 1152; see generally Petitioner's Brief at 13-15 (discussing all of the
out-of-state conduct brought before the jury with the implicit, and at some points explicit, instruction
to use the evidence to assess a punishment based on nationwide conduct).
364. See Petitioner's Brief at 13-15.
365. Id.
366. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1152.
367. See Cordray, supra note 81, at 299-309.
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assumed the conduct punished was limited to its own interests.368 The
opinion included only two lines, buried in the guidepost analysis, as to the
punishment's connection to Utah. 369 The first was located within the ratio
guidepost analysis, which stated, "State Farm's policies have affected vast
numbers of other Utah customers. ' 370 The second was later in that same
analysis; the court stated that "the large punitive damage award [was] based
upon the specific facts of this case. 37' These quick mentions were not
enough.372 It is imperative that the court do an analysis of the first prong of
the BMW case separately, as it could help clarify some of the issues in
controversy.373 Going directly into the guideposts, and not first clearly
establishing why the punishment was within Utah's legitimate state interest
to punish and deter, clouds what conduct was actually punished.374
The first issue should be what conduct is being punished and to what
extent.37 5 Then the court should determine if the defendant had adequate
notice that this conduct would illicit a large damage award.376 Based on
State Farm's brief to the United States Supreme Court, it is unclear what
conduct the Utah court actually punished.377 The opening statement by
Campbell's attorney, during phase two of the trial, in front of a new jury,
insisted that the jury needed to punish State Farm's nationwide conduct. 378
Specifically, Campbell's attorney told the jury that this case "transcends the
Campbell file," "involv[ing] a nationwide practice. '379
Additionally,
counsel stated that the jurors were "going to be evaluating and assessing, and
hopefully requiring State Farm to stand accountable for what it's doing
across the country, which is the purpose of punitive damages. 3 8 ° With an
opening including such statements, the jury was likely to be unsure as to
what it was actually punishing. 38' These excerpts contradict the proposition

368. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1152.
369. Id. at 1153.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1154.
372. See Petitioner's Brief at 17-21, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513
(2003) (No. 01-1289) (discussing the Utah court's inappropriate consideration of out-of-state
conduct and its failure to explain its interest in punishing conduct dissimilar to the conduct that
occurred in Utah), available at 2002 WL 1968000.
373. See id. at 1-50 (discussing the presentation of dissimilar out-of-state conduct to the jury, who
had unfettered discretion in its use).
374. Id.
375. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568-69 (1996).
376. See id.
377. See Petitioner's Brief at 1-50..
378. Id. at 6.
379. Id. at 6-7.
380. Id. at 6.
381. See id. at 6-8.
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for which BMW stands, that a state has a legitimate interest in punishing and
deterring conduct only within its territorial boundaries.382
State Farm's brief also contented that the evidence presented during this
phase of the trial continued in the same vein.383 Campbell's attorney focused
on Campbell's claim being only a part of the national "scheme" used by
State Farm under the PP&R.384 Witnesses brought forward by Campbell
testified as to a national focus. 385 One expert witness testified, "this case
is... about State Farm's pattern and practices nationwide ....The case is
about more than what happened in Utah, is my point. That's why I'm here
talking about all this other stuff. 3 86 Other former State Farm employees
who served as Campbell's witnesses testified as to conduct in other legally
separate State Farm corporations.387 State Farm contended that none of the
evidence presented by Campbell was shown to be unlawful in other states,
that in fact "many of [the practices] were specifically authorized by state
statutes and regulations. 388 The Utah Supreme Court relied on a Texas
judgment against State Farm in part of its analysis, even though that $100
million verdict was never entered because the case was settled for "pennies
on the dollar., 38 9 Finally, State Farm asserted that of the over 29,000 similar
cases in Utah last year, approximately 400 were litigated; of these 400, only
seven resulted in a finding of liability, and of those seven, no policyholder
paid any of the excess judgment. 390 Therefore, the Campbell case was an
aberration.39'
Knowing that petitioner's briefs are meant to be persuasive as to their
side of the story, there is validity in mentioning the incidents above. Most of
the evidence, combined with the opening statement, created a serious
question as to its actual use by the jury.392 Was this evidence improperly
used by the jury to punish all of the acts by State Farm over two decades,
resulting in a finding of $145 million in punitive damages? Conversely, was
it properly used to determine if State Farm had adequate notice of the
impending punishment?
If the above evidence from State Farm's brief was used to assess
39 3
punishment across the United States, this would be error under BMW.
However, filing it under the second prong of the analysis does not
automatically make it appropriate, either.394 The question is how the jury

382. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568-70 (1996).
383. Petitioner's Brief at 6-8.
384. Id. at 6-7.
385. Id.

386. Id. at 7.
387. Id. at 8. State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company is a separate legal entity from
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, which was involved in this case. Id.
388. Id. at 9.
389. Id. at I1.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. See id. at 1-13.
393. See supra notes 84-91, 160-69 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
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used the information.3 95 Using extraterritorial conduct that is not similar to
the conduct from which the case arose is inappropriate in assessing what
should be punished and to what extent.396 Conversely, using it to assess
blameworthiness under the notice prong is acceptable.397 However, as

previously stated, "the distinction is a fine one, and it is questionable
whether juries will be able to understand and apply it properly. There is a

significant risk.., the jury will succumb to the temptation to punish the
defendant directly for that conduct as well ...."398This risk is heightened
when opening statements include provocative language like the language
used by Campbell's attorney.399
Much of the evidence relied upon in discussion of the guideposts by the
400

Utah Supreme Court qualifies as extraterritorial and dissimilar conduct.

However, its use in the determination of adequate notice to State Farm was,
most likely, legitimate.40 ' The United States Supreme Court was tasked with
the challenge of determining whether the use of this evidence was to punish
or for notice purposes.40 2

Subsequent to the Utah Supreme Court's affirmation of the punitive
damages award as not grossly excessive, State Farm petitioned the United
States Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari.40 3

5. Disposition of the United States Supreme Court
While the Supreme Court addressed the issue of extraterritorial conduct

in reviewing punitive damages for excessiveness, it seems to have taken a
step away from BMW. 4° 4 Unlike BMW, the Court outlined the method for

395. See Cordray, supra note 81, at 312.
396. Id.
397. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-77 (1996).
398. Cordray, supra note 81, at 313-14.
399. See id.
400. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1159 (Utah 2001).
401. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-57 (1996).
402. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 122 S.Ct. 2326 (2002) (granting certiorari);
Petitioner's Brief at i, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003) (No. 011289) (listing the use of extraterritorial conduct as part of the question presented), available at 2002
WL 1968000.
403. Petitioner's Brief at i. The question the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
was:
Whether the Utah Supreme Court, in direct contravention of this Court's decision in
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore and fundamental principles of due process,
committed constitutional error by reinstating a $145 million punitive damage award that
punishes out-of-state conduct, is 145 times greater than the compensatory damages in the
case, and is based upon the defendant's alleged business practices nationwide over a
twenty year period, which were unrelated and dissimilar to the conduct by the defendant
that gave rise to the plaintiffs' claims?
Id. (citation omitted).
404. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).

reviewing punitive damages award solely using the three guidepost
analysis.4 °5
In BMW, the Court stated, "the federal excessiveness inquiry
appropriately begins with an identification of the state interests that a
punitive award is designed to serve. We therefore focus our attention first
on the scope of Alabama's legitimate interests in punishing BMW and
deterring it from future misconduct., 40 6 The Court continued its analysis by
discussing what is within a state's legitimate interest. 40 7 Only after "the
scope of the interest in punishment and deterrence that an Alabama court
may appropriately consider [was] properly limited" did the inquiry turn to
the three guideposts. 40 8 These guideposts were established to assess if "a
person [has] receive[d] fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject
him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a [s]tate may
impose. 40 9
Nine years later in State Farm, the Supreme Court seemingly altered
this analysis. 4'0 First, the Court explained the need for increased oversight
of punitive damages. 41 Then, it followed by establishing that the three
guideposts are to be used to determine if an award exceeds due process
limitations.41 2 The analysis of a state's legitimate interest was contained
within the guideposts, rather than being an initial independent
3
determination.
The Court dealt with the same issues, only in a different
414
manner.

a. Civil PenaltiesLack the Oversight of Criminal Penalties
"Under the principles outlined in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
this case is neither close nor difficult. ' 41 5 In announcing that the Utah
Supreme Court reinstated the original verdict in error, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the appropriate use of extraterritorial and
dissimilar conduct in assessing punitive damages and apparently altered the
punitive damages analysis.41 6 To begin the punitive damages analysis, the
Court established that, despite a state's discretion in awarding punitive
damages, there exist "procedural and substantive constitutional limitations
on these awards. 417 These limitations, which come from the Due Process
Clause, prevent "imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary

405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

512

See id. at 1520-26.
BMW, 517 U.S. at 569.
See id. at 568-74.
Id. at 574.
Id.
See State Farm, 123 S.Ct. at 1520.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1521.
Id.
ld. at 1519.
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punishments. '41 8 As noted by the Court in BMW, fair notice of the conduct
that is subject to punishment and the gravity of such punishment is part of
the due process analysis. 4' 9 Referring back to Haslip, the Court stated, "[t]o
the extent an award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose
and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property. 420
The legitimate purposes that can be furthered by these damages are
punishment and deterrence.42 ' In this manner, punitive damages awards are
similar in purpose to criminal penalties.422 However, unlike criminal
defendants, civil defendants are not given the same measure of protection
found in criminal proceedings.423 Because of this, the Court was concerned
over the imprecise manner in which punitive damages systems are
administered. 424 The Court framed this concern as follows:
Our concerns are heightened when the decisionmaker is
presented... with evidence that has little bearing as to the amount
of punitive damages that should be awarded.
Vague [jury]
instructions, or those that merely inform the jury to avoid "passion
or prejudice," do little to aid the decisionmaker in its task of
assigning appropriate weight to evidence that is relevant and
evidence that is tangential or only inflammatory.425
To address
its concerns, the Court returned to the guideposts initially set
4 26
out in BMW.
b. Reprehensibility Guidepost
i. State's Legitimate Interests
Returning to the BMW guideposts, the Court analyzed a state's
legitimate interests and the use of extraterritorial conduct under the
reprehensibility guidepost.2 7 Most notably, the focus of the reprehensibility
guidepost revolved around42what kinds of evidence can be used to assess the
factors identified in BMW. 1

418. Id. at 1519-20.
419.

Id. at 1520.

420.
421.
422.
423.

Id.
Id. at 1519.
Id. at 1520.
Id. at 1520-21.

424. Id.

425. Id. (citation omitted).
426. Id. at 1520.
427. Id. at 1521.
428. Id. The factors used to consider the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct included:
[Tihe harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evidenced
an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the
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In beginning its analysis of the appropriate use of evidence under the
reprehensibility guidepost, the Court recognized a state's legitimate interests
and the limitations of these interests.429 In analyzing the State Farm case
under this guidepost, the Court acknowledged Utah's legitimate state
interests.430 While State Farm's conduct toward Campbell "merit[ed] no
praise," the Court remarked that "a more modest punishment for this
reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the [s]tate's legitimate
'
objectives."4 31
Utah did not focus on its own legitimate state interests, but
instead used this case "as a platform to expose, and punish, the perceived
432
deficiencies of State Farm's operations throughout the country.
Campbell was allowed openly to assert that State Farm should be punished
for conduct beyond this one instance, urging the jury to "require[] State
Farm to stand accountable for what it's doing across the county, which is the
purpose of punitive damages. '433 Campbell convinced the trial court that the
then existing punitive damages jurisprudence provided "no limitation on the
scope of evidence that could be considered. 434
ii. Extraterritoriality
Contrary to Campbell's assertion, with this decision the Supreme Court
established that certain limitations do exist in considering evidence of
conduct under the reprehensibility guidepost. 435 The Court turned its
attention to the use of extraterritorial lawful and unlawful conduct.436
Lawful conduct's use was outlined in the Court's BMW decision. 437 Due to
federalist principles, a state cannot punish conduct that was lawful where it
occurred. 438 A state's jurisdictional boundaries prevent it from wielding
power over other states.439

conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, deceit, or
mere accident.
Id. at 1521 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576-77 (1996)). In examining the
evidence, if none of the factors is present then a punitive damages award is "suspect." Id. However,
even if the evidence supports one of the factors in favor of the plaintiff, that might not "be sufficient
to sustain a punitive damages award." Id. The Court noted that since it is presumed that a plaintiff
is made whole through a compensatory damage award, "punitive damages should only be awarded if
the defendant's culpability ... is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to
achieve punishment or deterrence." Id.
429. Id. at 1521-22.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 1521.
432. Id. The Court noted that the Utah Supreme Court explicitly stated its rationale for upholding
the original verdict against State Farm was a "condem[nation] for its nationwide policies rather than
for the conduct directed toward the Campbells." Id.
433. Id. at 1522. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 242).
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 1522-23.
437. See supra notes 171-80 and accompanying text.
438. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1522.
439. See id.
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Unlike lawful conduct, until State Farm the Court had not given a
definitive answer on the use of the defendant's extraterritorial unlawful
conduct. 440 The Court stated that "as a general rule" a state does not have "a
legitimate concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for
unlawful acts committed outside of the [s]tate's jurisdiction." 44 1 Instead, any
adjudication of such acts by Utah would require the application of the law in
the state where the conduct arose."4
Campbell argued that the conduct presented in the case was not an
attempt to punish lawful or unlawful acts by State Farm, but rather to
demonstrate a "motive against its insured." 4 43 According to the Court,
"[t]his argument misse[d] the mark." "4 Granted, this conduct has possible
probative value "when it demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of
the defendant's action in the [s]tate where it is tortious;" however, it is
essential that there be a nexus between the conduct and the specific harm
suffered by the plaintiff. 445 In order to bring forward evidence of
extraterritorial conduct, the jury must be advised that "it may not use
evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant." 44 6 As the Court
held in previous decisions, there exists "[a] basic principle of federalism...
that each [s]tate may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is
permitted or proscribed within its borders, and each [s]tate alone can
determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant
who acts within its jurisdiction." 447
In general, the evidence of extraterritorial conduct presented by
Campbell was fundamentally problematic because it bore no relation to
Campbell's harm." 8 "A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the
acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for
punitive damages."" 9 The Court observed that the inclusion of these other
acts creates the potential of punishing individuals because they are unlikable
instead of for the conduct that actually harmed the plaintiff.450 The Court
stated that undoubtedly the Utah Supreme Court violated due process when,
in calculating the punitive damages award, it "adjudicate[d] the merits of
other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the

440. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996) (addressing the use of
extraterritorial lawful conduct but not mentioning extraterritorial unlawful conduct.).
441. State Farm, 123 S.Ct. at 1522.
442. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985)).
443.

Id.

444. Id.
445. Id.

446. Id.
447. Id. at 1523.
448. Id.
449.
450.

Id.
Id.

reprehensibility analysis., 45 1 In doing this, the court created452the possibility
of "multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct.,
Additionally, the Court replied to the argument that the nationwide
conduct presented by Campbell was to show that State Farm was a recidivist
in harming its customers.453
Considering extraterritorial conduct for

purposes of recidivism presents the same problems as considering
extraterritorial conduct in determining culpability and deliberateness.454 To
determine if the defendant is a recidivist in a civil case, "courts must ensure
the conduct in question replicates the prior transgressions. 455 This seems to

be a stricter standard than the nexus requirement for use of extraterritorial
evidence determining culpability and deliberateness.456 The Court held that

there was no showing by the Campbells that any of the extraterritorial
conduct alleged
against State Farm was "repeated misconduct of the sort that
' 457
injured them.
The reprehensibility guidepost has limitations. 458 Those limitations
"do[] not permit courts to expand the scope of the case so that a defendant

may be punished for any malfeasance, which in this case extended for a 20year period., 459 The Court stated that the evidence brought forward by
Campbell was not similar in any fashion to the harm suffered by Campbell;
460
therefore it was not relevant to the reprehensibility guidepost analysis.

451. Id.
452. Id.; see Jeffries, supra note 269, at 153 (addressing multiple punitive damages awards).
453. See State Farm, 123 S.Ct. at1523.
454. Id. at 1522.
455. Id. at 1523.
456. See id. at 1522-23.
457. Id. at 1523.
458. See id. at 1524.
459. Id.
460. See id. The Court analyzed a specific example that the Utah Supreme Court gave to justify
reinstating the large award under the reprehensibility guidepost analysis. Id. at 1525. The Utah
Supreme Court emphasized that State Farm had not reported a previous large punitive damages
award to its headquarters. ld. The Court noted that this failure to report was extraterritorial conduct,
and that if "similar, might have had some bearing on the degree of reprehensibility, subject to the
limitations we have described." Id. Because this extraterritorial conduct was dissimilar, it was "of
such marginal relevance that it should have been accorded little or no weight." Id. However, this
distinction between what is relevant and irrelevant is open to interpretation. This is evidenced by
Justice Ginsburg's dissent. See id. at 1527. After establishing that punitive damages awards are a
state concern, not a federal concern, Ginsburg addressed the evidence of conduct that had been
presented. Id.Ginsburg proceeded to review all of the evidence the majority considered "marginal."
Id. In her analysis, the conduct presented was extremely telling of State Farm's behavior, and it
directly related to the type of conduct suffered by Campbell. See id. at 1528-31. Ginsburg saw a
nexus between the "overarching underpayment scheme" and the Campbells' injury. Id. at 1530.
The differing views of the majority and Ginsburg illustrate the difficulty courts will have in applying
this decision. See id. at 1525, 1527. One court might define certain conduct as similar, while a
higher reviewing court may see it as not similar enough. See id. The Court's reprehensibility
guidepost analysis is amorphous at best.
Next, the ratio guidepost was addressed. Id. at 1524. The Court discussed other examples
given by the Utah Supreme Court to justify the disparity between the compensatory and punitive
damage awards under the ratio guidepost. Id. First, the Court established there are no rigid
benchmarks that punitive damage awards cannot exceed and still be constitutional. Id. As a general
rule, the ratio should not exceed single digits; however as long as the punishment is "both reasonable
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State Farm upheld the idea that a punitive damages award can violate
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 46' Even though the purposes of
punitive damages are similar to the purposes of criminal penalties, civil

damages require more scrutiny because they lack the safeguards afforded
criminal defendants.462 This oversight occurs in the review of the award

under the three guideposts established in BMW.4 63 Specifically, a state's
legitimate interest is now examined under the reprehensibility guidepost, not
as

an

independent

analysis. 4

4

Additionally,

the

consideration

of

extraterritorial conduct is addressed in the same guidepost.465 With this
decision, the guideposts appear to move from a tool measuring adequate

notice to the defendant to the sole assessment tool for the damage award.466
The reprehensibility guidepost appears to include both the state's467legitimate
interest as well as the consideration of different types of conduct.
IV.

CONCLUSION: WHAT'S NEXT? FUTURE RAMIFICATIONS FOR PUNITIVE
DAMAGE AWARDS

The Supreme Court's decision in State Farm seems to simplify the
punitive damages analysis required by reviewing courts.468 Reviewing
courts will only be required to consider the three guideposts developed in
BMW.4 69 The Court clarified the consideration of unlawful extraterritorial
conduct under the reprehensibility guidepost. 470 For the trial court to
consider unlawful extraterritorial conduct, it must have a nexus to the state
conduct punished.4 7' Otherwise, if the conduct is dissimilar, it only has

marginal probative value and is essentially useless.472 The decision fills in
the gap the Court left in BMW, so the reviewing courts should find it easier
to decide what evidence of conduct is permissible. 473 The reviewing courts
and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered" it
will be acceptable. Id. It is likely that the ratio guidepost will be the focus of much of the reviewing
courts' discussions in applying this decision, because it is an easy analysis. See id. The reviewing
courts will look to see if the ratio is larger than the single digit guideline. See id. This guidepost has
the potential to dominate much of the analysis done by reviewing courts, as the ratio limitation is the
most concrete directive in the whole opinion. The reprehensibility guidepost analysis, on the other
hand, leaves a great deal of room for subjectivity and confusion. See id. at 1521-22.
461. Id. at 1519.
462. See supra notes 417-28 and accompanying text.
463. See supra notes 417-62 and accompanying text.
464. See supra notes 429-36 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 437-62 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 417-62 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 429-62 and accompanying text.
468. See supra notes 402-62 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 417-62 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 437-62 and accompanying text.
471. See supra note 447 and accompanying text.
472. See supra note 451 and accompanying text.
473. See supra note 442 and accompanying text.

are just beginning to apply the State Farm decision to analyze punitive
damages awards.474
The area where some confusion may still exist for reviewing courts is a
determination of a state's legitimate interest. 475 While certain conduct can
be considered for purposes of determining reprehensibility under the
guideposts, what conduct can be used to determine a state's legitimate
interest? In BMW, the court emphasized a primary analysis of a state's
legitimate interests. 476 Only after that interest was defined would a court
apply the guideposts to assess if the defendant had adequate notice of the
punishment.477 It seems likely that collapsing the entire analysis into the
reprehensibility guidepost might confuse the courts.478 If reprehensibility is
used to determine notice, how does defining a state's legitimate interest in
punishing and deterring the conduct in question fall into that category? The
Ninth Circuit in White held that application of the guideposts was
unnecessary because the state did not have a legitimate interest in punishing
the conduct at all.479 Perhaps the State Farm Court assumed that Utah had
the right to punish the conduct without an independent assessment and was
only considering the adequate notice portion of the analysis to determine if
there had been a violation of the Due Process Clause.
The .danger is that reviewing courts might overlook whether the state
had the right to punish conduct to a given extent and instead jump right into
an examination of if the defendant had adequate notice.480 This is not to
indicate that the Court did not address a state's legitimate interest in
punishment and deterrence, because it did. 4 8 ' However, by collapsing the
analysis, the Court may have made it confusing to apply.482
What remains to be seen is if this decision actually helps courts
determine whether punitive damages awards are reasonable or if this just
another finger in the proverbial dike. This question will only be answered as
reviewing courts begin applying this decision to punitive damage awards.
Heather Burgess
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474. See, e.g., Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 2003 WL 1996087 (Ark. May 1, 2003) (noting the State
Farm decision directs courts to use the BMW guideposts to analyze a punitive damages award). On
April 21, 2003, the Supreme Court remanded several cases immediately after deciding the State
Farm case. See, e.g., DeKalb Genetics Corp. v. Bayer CropScience, 123 S. Ct. 1828 (2003); Key
Pharm., Inc. v. Edwards, 123 S. Ct. 1781 (2003); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. v. Textron Fin. Corp., 123 S.
Ct. 1783 (2003).
475. See supra notes 429-36 and accompanying text.
476. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
477. See supra notes 91-116 and accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 91-116, 429-62 and accompanying text.
479. White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998 (2002).
480. See supra notes 417-62 and accompanying text.
481. See supra notes 429-62 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 91-116, 417-62 and accompanying text.
483. J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law, May 2004. I would to thank my family for all
their tireless support.

